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Abstract 
Despite being one of the “heavyweights” in international trade, finance and 
development, the European Union’s (EU) presence in the economic governance fora 
of the United Nations (UN) continues to be fraught with difficulties. Faced with the 
legal and political hurdles of multilateral diplomacy in a state-centric environment, the 
EU has had to deal with a lack of status and participation rights, the complexities of 
an internal coordination process involving 28 Member States, and the challenges of 
ensuring a cohesive external representation. This contribution provides a brief 
overview of the legal basis for EU engagement in the UN, the Union’s internal 
coordination process, as well as the framework governing its external representation. 
To highlight the patchwork of legal statuses and modes of engagement, we 
subsequently take a closer look at the EU’s relations with a select number of UN 
bodies in the area of economic governance. This allows us to illustrate the respective 
challenges in three scenarios: (1) UN fora where the EU and the EU Member States 
hold membership rights, where we look at FAO; (2) UN fora where the EU holds an 
observer or full participant status while its Member States have membership rights, 
where we look at ECOSOC, its subsidiary bodies, and UNCTAD; and (3) UN fora 
where the EU Member States are members but where the EU has no formal status: 
here we look at the World Bank. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Union (EU) ranks among the major economic powers in the world. It is 
one of the world’s largest economies in terms of nominal Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP),1 the largest exporter of manufactured goods and services, the biggest export 
market for around 80 countries, and one of the principal sources of foreign direct 
investments (FDI).2 The Euro has been considered as the most important currency 
after the US Dollar,3 and the EU and its Member States continue to be among the 
major donors of development aid.4 Thus, while the EU ranks among the 
                                               
1
 World Bank, data of 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last accessed 14 
February 2017). 
2
 European Commission, EU position in world trade, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/eu-position-in-
world-trade/ (last accessed 14 February 2017). 
3
 Hervé (2012), p. 143. 
4
 OECD, Development aid in 2015 continues to grow despite costs for in-donor refugees, 13 April 2016, 
www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ODA-2015-detailed-summary.pdf (last accessed 14 February 2017). 
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heavyweights in international trade, finance and development, it experiences 
difficulties when it comes to translating this economic clout into political influence in 
global multilateral organizations. The EU has often been perceived to “punch below 
its weight” at the multilateral level, and has even been termed a “political dwarf”.5  
The 2017 European Yearbook of International Economic Law discusses the EU’s 
engagement with a number of international economic governance organizations and 
institutions. It addresses the persistent difficulties associated with the engagement of 
a regional organization – the EU – in a state-centric environment, including the 
questions of legal status, internal coordination and external representation. While 
other contributions in the Yearbook focus specifically on the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)6 and the World Trade Organization (WTO),7 this contribution only 
addresses the EU’s engagement with (other) bodies of the United Nations (UN) and 
the UN family of organizations. Its findings therefore do not necessarily apply to the 
EU’s position in the IMF and WTO8 and in more informal bodies of global economic 
governance, such as the G7 and the G20.9 
The UN’s own role in global economic governance is not exactly a success story. 
Although, pursuant to its Charter, the organization was also set up “to promote social 
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom” and “to employ international 
machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all 
peoples”,10 and though one of its purposes is to “achieve international cooperation in 
solving international problems of an economic […] character”11, these aims have in 
practice been overshadowed by the UN’s goal to maintain international peace and 
security.12 Two of the UN’s principal organs were mandated to work on economic 
governance: the General Assembly (which was inter alia tasked to “initiate studies 
                                               
5
 Hervé (2012), p. 143. This assessment is not unique to the EU’s engagement with economic 
governance institutions, see e.g. Thomas (2012) on the EU and the International Criminal Court, and 
Smith (2010) on the EU at the UN Human Rights Council. 
6
 See the contribution to the 2017 European Yearbook of International Economic Law (Vol. 8) by P. 
Leino. 
7
 See the contributions to the 2017 European Yearbook of International Economic Law (Vol. 8) by C. 
Kaddous and J. Bohanes. 
8
 For earlier writings on the EU-IMF relationship, see Wouters, Ramopoulos (2016), p. 21-37; Wouters, 
Van Kerckhoven, Ramopoulos (2013), p. 306-327; Wouters, Van Kerckhoven (2012), p. 221-233. On the 
EU-WTO relationship, see Wouters (2013), p. 373-383. 
9
 On the EU-G20 relationship, see inter alia Wouters, Van Kerckhoven, Odermatt (2013), p. 259-271. 
10
 Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter), fourth and eighth recital of the preamble. 
11
 Article 1(3) UN Charter. Article 55 UN Charter develops this objective further: “With a view to the 
creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the 
United Nations shall promote: a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic 
and social progress and development; b. solutions of international economic […] problems […].” 
12
 Kirton J, The United Nations, Global Economic Governance and the G20. Lecture given at the 
University of Leuven, 10 December 2015, text available at www.g20.utoronto.ca/biblio/kirton-un-g20-
151210.html (last accessed 14 February 2017). 
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and make recommendations for the purpose of […] promoting international 
cooperation in the economic […] field […]”)13 and, under the authority of the latter,14 
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Neither of them fully lived up to the 
Charter’s aspirations. There are many reasons for the UN’s marginalization as an 
actor in global economic governance, including its primary focus on peace and 
security and its institutional design, which has often obstructed communication and 
coordination between the various organs, agencies and other bodies in the UN 
system.15 Historically, the UN was quickly sidelined by the IMF and the World Bank, 
and now stands in the shadow of the G20.  
There have been numerous proposals to strengthen the UN’s role in global economic 
governance.16 The EU itself has traditionally been a strong advocate of the UN and 
the UN system.17 As the European Security Strategy of 2003 underlined, 
“[s]trengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act 
effectively, is a European priority”.18 The Lisbon Treaty additionally strengthened the 
Union’s commitment to multilateralism in general and to the UN in particular. 
Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)19 provides that the EU “shall 
promote multilateral solutions to common problems, particularly in the framework of 
the United Nations”, and it enshrines the promotion of an “international system based 
on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance” as an objective of 
the Union’s foreign policy. The EU institutions are tasked to comply with the 
commitments entered into within the UN framework, and to cooperate with UN 
bodies where appropriate.20 Also the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy underlines the EU’s 
determination to “promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key 
principle and the United Nations at its core.”21 
However, despite the EU’s economic clout, on the one hand, and its commitment to 
the UN system, on the other, the EU’s role in UN economic governance fora 
                                               
13
 Article 13(1)(b) UN Charter. 
14
 Article 60 UN Charter. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 See inter alia UNGA Resolutions 67/289 of 9 July 2013 on “The United Nations in global economic 
governance”; 66/256 of 16 March 2012 on “The United Nations in global governance”; 65/94 of 8 
December 2010 on “The United Nations in global governance”; UN Secretary General Report “The 
United Nations in global economic governance”, A/71/378, 16 September 2016. 
17
 See for more details Wouters, Chané (2016), p. 299-323. 
18
 European Council, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, 12 
December 2003, p. 9. 
19
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 7 June 2016, O.J. C 202/13. 
20
 See e.g. Article 208(2), 214(7), 220(1) TFEU. 
21
 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s 
Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf (last accessed 14 February 
2017). 
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continues to be fraught with obstacles. This contribution seeks to provide a brief 
overview of the legal basis for EU engagement in the UN, the Union’s internal 
coordination process, as well as the framework governing its external representation. 
To highlight the patchwork of legal statuses and modes of engagement, we 
subsequently take a closer look at the EU’s relations with a select number of UN 
bodies in the area of economic governance. This allows us to illustrate the respective 
challenges in three scenarios: (1) UN fora where the EU and the EU Member States 
hold membership rights, where we look at FAO; (2) UN fora where the EU holds an 
observer or full participant status while its Member States have membership rights, 
where we look at ECOSOC, its subsidiary bodies, and UNCTAD; and (3) UN fora 
where the EU Member States are members but where the EU has no formal status: 
here we look at the World Bank. 
2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EU ENGAGEMENT WITH THE UN AND THE UN SYSTEM 
 
The EU’s engagement with the UN and the UN system is governed both by EU law 
and by the treaties, resolutions, rules of procedure and other instruments that 
together constitute the legal framework of the UN. EU engagement with the UN, 
therefore, not only depends on the Union’s external relations competences as 
provided for in the EU Treaties, but also on whether and to what extent UN bodies 
permit  the participation of the EU. 
Within the EU’s legal framework, Article 220(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU)22 provides that the “Union shall establish all appropriate 
forms of cooperation with the organs of the United Nations and its specialised 
agencies”, thus recognizing the importance of EU-UN cooperation. Indeed, EU 
engagement with multilateral fora is vital in order to ensure effective EU external 
action, in particular in areas of exclusive EU competence. Similar provisions exist for 
a variety of policy areas, e.g. on environmental policy (Article 191(4) TFEU), 
development cooperation (Article 211 TFEU), and economic, financial and technical 
cooperation (Article 212(3) TFEU). While these provisions empower and oblige the 
Union to cooperate with the UN and other international organizations, they only cover 
organizational relations,23 whereas substantive agreements negotiated within the 
framework of the UN must be concluded in line with the requirements and procedure 
outlined in Articles 216 and 218 TFEU. As Article 216 TFEU provides, the Union may 
                                               
22
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 7 June 2016, O.J. C 
202/47. 
23
 Geiger R in Geiger R, Khan DE, Kotzur M (2015) Article 220 para. 4. 
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enter into a binding legal agreement with an international organization if either one of 
four requirements are met: where (1) the Treaties so provide; (2) where the 
conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve one of the objectives 
referred to in the Treaties; (3) where this is provided for in a legally binding Union act; 
or (4) where this is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope. The first 
category merely declaratorily provides that the Union may enter into agreements if 
this is already provided for elsewhere in the Treaties. For example, Article 207(3) 
TFEU grants the Union this competence in the area of the common commercial 
policy, as does Article 212(3) TFEU in the area of economic, financial and technical 
cooperation. The third category mirrors this provision at the level of secondary EU 
law. Categories 2 and 4 grant the Union implicit treaty making powers, in line with 
established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).24  
However, the EU’s internal competence to cooperate with the UN and the UN system 
does not necessarily correspond to actual cooperation between both organizations. 
The UN remains a predominantly state-centric institution, thus limiting the 
possibilities for formal participation of the EU. As Article 4(1) UN Charter provides, 
“[m]embership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states” 
(emphasis added), which is widely understood as limiting membership of the main 
organization to states, thus excluding non-state entities such as the EU.25 However, 
UN agencies and other fora are free to include different provisions in their constituent 
treaties, rules of procedure etc. The Constitution of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), for example, was amended in 1991 to include a regional 
economic integration organization (REIO) clause, permitting the EU (in those days 
the European Economic Community) to join the FAO as a “member organization”.26 
Today, the EU holds a variety of different statuses in the various bodies of the UN 
system, ranging from membership status, to full participant, enhanced observer, 
observer or no status. Only membership grants the EU the full range of participatory 
rights, including the right to vote. As an observer, the EU may usually attend (formal) 
meetings and make interventions – though its speaking time slots will often be later 
and shorter than those of members. Observers are usually seated apart from the 
Member States, may not raise points of order or propose candidates. In a number of 
UN bodies, the EU has no formal status at all, forcing it to rely entirely on 
representation through the EU Member States. This patchwork of statuses and 
                                               
24
 Opinion 1/03 Lugano Convention [2006] ECR I-1145; Opinion 1/76 European laying-up fund for inland 
waterway vessels [1977] ECR 741; Opinion 1/94 WTO [1994] ECR I-5267. See Kuijper, Wouters, 
Hoffmeister, De Baere, Ramopoulos (2015), p. 1-11. 
25
 Hoffmeister (2007), p. 41. 
26
 Article II(3) FAO Constitution. 
8 
 
participation rights has long been considered as unsatisfactory among EU policy 
makers. In 2003, the Commission demanded that the Community “should be given 
the possibility to participate fully in the work of UN bodies where matters of 
Community competence are concerned, and Member States should contribute 
effectively towards this”.27 With full participation out of reach, in 2012 the then 
European Commission President Barroso and Vice-President Ashton proposed a 
more sober “Strategy for the progressive improvement of the EU status in 
international organisations and other fora in line with the objectives of the Treaty of 
Lisbon”.28 Though still calling for an “improvement of the EU status and its alignment 
with the objectives of the EU Treaties”, it avoided any reference to concrete 
negotiation goals.29 In practice, EU efforts for status upgrades have faced serious 
political resistance, both internally and externally. The saga around the EU’s 
enhanced participation rights in the UN General Assembly30 appears to have had a 
dampening effect on similar efforts in other fora. 
3. INTERNAL COORDINATION AND EXTERNAL REPRESENTATION 
 
As a Union of (still) 28 Member States, internal coordination is an essential aspect of 
EU external action. Its primary function is to ensure the coherent presence of the EU 
at the international level, meaning that all EU actors – EU and EU Member States 
representatives – speak with one voice and vote cohesively. In those fora where the 
EU itself does not have a formal status, internal coordination serves to ensure that 
the EU Member States represent existing Union positions, and in fora where both the 
EU and the EU Member States have membership status, internal coordination is vital 
to clarify the internal division of competences and, thus, who will exercise the 
participation rights with regard to each individual agenda item.31  
In line with the principle of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU), the EU Member 
States must refrain from any act that may run counter to obtaining the EU’s 
                                               
27
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – The European 
Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism, 10 September 2003, COM(2003) 526 final, 
p. 23. 
28
 Communication to the Commission from the President in Agreement with Vice-President Ashton – 
Strategy for the progressive improvement of the EU status in international organisations and other fora 
in line with the objectives of the Treaty of Lisbon, 20 December 2012, C(2012) 9420 final, on file with the 
authors. 
29
 See for a detailed analysis of the Barroso-Ashton Strategy, Wouters, Chané, Odermatt, Ramopoulos 
(2015), p. 45-74. 
30
 In 2011 the EU’s was granted additional participation rights in the UNGA, see UNGA Res 65/276 (3 
May 2011) UN Doc A/RES/65/276. For a detailed analysis see inter alia Brewer (2012), p. 181-225; 
Wouters, Ramopoulos, Odermatt (2011), p. 166-170; Wouters, Odermatt, Ramopoulos (2013), p. 211-
223. 
31
 In case of ‘mixity’, membership rights can only be exercised on an alternative basis by either the EU 
or its Member States, see e.g. Article II(8) FAO Constitution. 
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objectives and instead assist the Union in fulfilling its tasks. On the basis of this 
principle, Member States are required to coordinate their actions in international 
organizations, especially for those competences that refer to “integrated policies” – 
previously called Community competences. It is interesting to point to the original 
Article 116 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC 
Treaty),32 which required that, “[f]rom the end of the transitional period onwards, 
Member States shall, in respect of all matters of particular interest to the common 
market, proceed within the framework of international organisations of an economic 
character only by common action.” This provision was deleted by the Maastricht 
Treaty, albeit in somewhat ambivalent circumstances and against the will of the 
European Commission.33 It is important to note that, from a strictly legal point of view, 
for the EU’s actions on economic, financial and trade matters within global 
governance fora, including of the UN, the legal principles and doctrines applicable 
are fundamentally those of the TFEU, combined with the principle of sincere 
cooperation, and not those laid down in Articles 24(3) and 34 TEU, which only apply 
to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).34 In practice, the 
distinction does not always appear to be made consistently in the context of EU 
coordination efforts at the UN.35  
Coordination between the EU and the EU Member States is a complex process, from 
strategy development in Brussels, to the fine-tuning on the ground in New York, 
Geneva, Rome and other UN venues. In Brussels, the Commission and several 
working parties of the Council prepare the Union’s positions at the UN, depending on 
the subject matter and the forum. At a general level, the United Nations Working 
Party (CONUN) develops the Union’s UN policy, with a focus on strengthening and 
reforming the UN system, and maintaining international peace and security. Other 
Council working parties have regional and thematic portfolios. The Coordination 
                                               
32
 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. 
33
 Cloos, Reinesch, Vignes, Weyland (1993), p. 345-346. 
34
 Article 24(3) TEU provides: “The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy 
actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s 
action in this area. The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political 
solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to 
impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.” This provision aims at ensuring 
the effectiveness of the EU at the international stage by obliging the EU member states to ensure a 
cohesive external façade through cooperation and coordination. It consequently limits, in the area of 
CFSP, the Member States’ freedom to take unilateral action in UN fora. This duty to cooperate and 
coordinate in the framework of international organizations, as far as CFSP is concerned, is enshrined in 
Article 34(1) TEU. It provides that “Member States shall coordinate their action in international 
organisations and at international conferences” and that they “shall uphold the Union’s positions in such 
forums”. Article 34(1), second para., and 34(2), first para., TEU also makes special provisions for those 
international fora where not all EU Member States are represented. The rules on the UN Security 
Council in Article 34(2), second para., constitute a remarkable derogation from these principles. 
35
 This could be regarded as a form of ‘intergovernmentalisation’ of the external dimension of EU 
integrated policy areas. 
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Working Party of the Agriculture and Fisheries Council, for example, coordinates EU 
and EU Member States positions at meetings of the FAO, whereas the Working 
Party on Forestry prepares issues discussed in the FAO Committee on Forestry 
(COFO), and the Codex Alimentarius Working Party coordinates positions in the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, where the EU and EU Member States have 
membership status. The Union Delegations in New York, Geneva, Washington DC, 
Rome etc. chair the local coordination process, having taken over this role from the 
rotating Council Presidency since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.36 
With regard to the external representation of the Union, much has changed with the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The reform of the Union’s external relations 
architecture, including among others the creation of the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the establishment of the European External 
Action Service, is aimed at increasing the effectiveness of EU foreign policy. Ideally 
the EU should now be represented by its own officials, leaving only a limited role for 
the rotating Council Presidency. In practice, however, the EU’s limited participation 
rights in most UN bodies still force it to rely on representation through the Member 
States, usually the one holding the Council Presidency. The EU’s external 
representation at the UN is, therefore, still spread on many shoulders. Depending on 
the subject-matter and on the level of the meeting, the EU will be represented by the 
Commission (in matters that do not fall under the CFSP), the President of the 
European Council and the High Representative (in CFSP matters) and/or the EU 
Delegation. The Member States continue to speak on their own behalf and will speak 
“on behalf of the EU” whenever the Union’s lack of participation rights so requires. If 
a matter falls within an area of both EU and national competence, the EU’s 
representative will be determined on the basis of whether the “thrust” of the issue 
falls under EU or national competence.37 
4. EU ENGAGEMENT WITH UN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE FOR A 
 
Over time, the EU has acquired a patchwork of legal statuses and participation rights 
in the various UN bodies. Full membership, such as in the FAO (4.1.) is still the 
exception. In most bodies, the EU holds observer status, for example in ECOSOC 
and its subsidiary bodies, as well as in the UN Conference on Trade and 
                                               
36
 Council of the European Union, Presidency report to the European Council on the European External 
Action Service, 23 October 2009, (14930/09), para. 31. 
37
 Cf. Arrangement concerning preparation for the meetings of the FAO as well as interventions and 
voting, 18 December 1991, unpublished, reproduced in Frid (1995), Annex VI, Article 2.3. The 1991 
Arrangement was updated in 1992 and 1995. 
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Development (UNCTAD), which is a subsidiary body of the UN General Assembly 
(4.2.). Finally, there remain a number of bodies within the UN framework, where the 
EU has no formal status, such as the World Bank, although its Member States may 
be members (4.3.). 
4.1. Member status: The EU in the FAO 
 
The FAO is one of the very few UN organizations where the EU has obtained 
membership status. Founded in 1945 as a specialized agency of the UN, the FAO 
pursues the three-fold aim to eradicate hunger and poverty, to promote economic 
and social progress, and to contribute to the sustainable management of natural 
resources.38 First contacts between the FAO and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) were already established in the 1950s, reflecting the Union’s 
competences in the area of agriculture and fisheries.39 Though a formal agreement 
between the EEC and the FAO was initially considered, it was at that time rejected 
as not feasible.40 Instead, the EEC was granted observer status through an 
exchange of letters between the Director-General of the FAO and the President of 
the European Commission in 1962.41 As the letters provided, cooperation between 
the EEC and the FAO was supposed to take the form of information exchange, 
consultation, participation of observers in meetings of common interest (upon 
invitation), and the potential creation of mixed committees to examine topics of 
common interest. These participation rights were soon considered as insufficient by 
the European Commission. The Commission deplored in particular that it “could not 
table any proposals, did not take part in the policy making of the organization, and 
was not able to fully participate in technical bodies established in the framework of 
the FAO”.42 After exploratory talks, the Council of the European Community decided 
on 22 October 1990 to send a letter requesting the formal opening of accession 
negotiations.43 The negotiations were formally initiated on 1 February 1991. In June 
1991, the FAO Council debated the necessary amendments to the FAO Constitution, 
                                               
38
 FAO, About FAO, www.fao.org/about/en/ (last accessed 14 February 2017). 
39
 Agriculture has been one of the core competences of the EU since the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community tasked the EEC with the creation of a common agricultural policy 
(‘CAP’), Article 3(d), 38-47 EEC Treaty. 
40
 Schild (2013), p. 225. 
41
 Exchange of letters between the Director-General of the FAO, Sen, and the President of the 
European Commission, Hallstein, 25 October 1962 and 11 December 1962, reprinted in Commission of 
the European Communities, ‘The European Community, international organizations and multilateral 
agreements’, 3rd ed., January 1983, p. 97-99. 
42
 Frid (1993), p. 241. 
43
 See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council decision on the access of the 
European Community to the FAO at the 26th session of the FAO Conference, 18 October 1991, 
COM(91)387 final; Frid (1993), p. 246. 
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which would allow for the accession of a REIO as a member organization. Among 
others, a clause was inserted that provided: 
The Conference may by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, provided that a 
majority of the Member Nations of the Organization is present, decide to admit as a 
Member of the Organization any regional economic integration organization meeting 
the criteria set out in paragraph 4 of this Article, which has submitted an application 
for membership and a declaration made in a formal instrument that it will accept the 
obligations of the Constitution as in force at the time of admission.
44
 
Eligibility was limited to REIOs which are: 
constituted by sovereign States, a majority of which are Member Nations of the 
Organization, and to which its Member States have transferred competence over a 
range of matters within the purview of the Organization, including the authority to 
make decisions binding on its Member States in respect of those matters.
45
 
This provision, though referring to REIOs generally, was clearly tailored towards the 
EEC, and it is doubtful whether there is currently any other international organization 
which would meet the required level of integration. On 25 November 1991 the 
Council of the European Community requested admission, which was accepted the 
next day by the FAO Conference with 98 states voting in favour, 6 against, and 3 
abstentions.46 
As a “Member Organization”, the EU enjoys generally the same participation rights 
as Member States, including the right to vote. However, owing to its particular nature, 
several exceptions were made. In particular, as a Member Organization, the EU may 
not participate in certain restricted committees47 and the committees responsible for 
the internal working of the Conference. Since the EU does not contribute to the 
budget of the FAO but only pays a sum that covers the administrative expenses of its 
membership, it does not have voting rights on budget matters.48 The EU may not 
hold office in the Conference, the Council and their subsidiary bodies, nor does it 
have the right to vote for elective places in both organs.49  
In addition, several arrangements were made to deal with the parallel membership of 
both the EU and the EU Member States (“mixity”). As Article II(8) of the FAO 
                                               
44
 Article II(3) FAO Constitution. 
45
 Article II(4) FAO Constitution. 
46
 Frid (1993), p. 246. 
47
 Programme Committee, Finance Committee, Committee on Constitutional and Legal Matters, Article 
II(9) FAO Constitution, Rule XLVI FAO General Rules. 
48
 Article XVIII(6) FAO Constitution. 
49
 Article II(9) FAO Constitution; Rules XLIII(3), XLIV FAO General Rules. 
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Constitution provides, a Member Organization “shall exercise membership rights on 
an alternative basis with its Member States that are Member Nations of the 
Organization in the areas of their respective competences”. It, therefore, needs to be 
established on a case by case basis whether the EU or the Member States will 
exercise their participatory rights, which requires a high degree of internal 
coordination. In order to increase the effectiveness of this process, the Commission 
and the Council adopted an internal “Arrangement Regarding Preparation for FAO 
Meetings and Statements and Voting”.50 It provides that the EU will exercise 
membership rights if an issue falls in the area of exclusive EU competence, and that 
the EU Member State holding the rotating Council Presidency will represent the 
Union in case of Member State competence. In cases of mixed competence, a 
common position should be sought, based on whether the “thrust” of the issue falls in 
exclusive EU or Member States competence,51 with the Permanent Representatives 
Committee of the Council (COREPER) deciding in case of a disagreement.52 
Nevertheless, internal coordination remained cumbersome and has prompted the 
Commission to propose a set of revised amendments in 2013.53 Among others, the 
draft arrangements proposed that full statements should only be prepared in 
exceptional cases, while the new default modus operandi for EU positions in the FAO 
should be the one of “lines to take”.54 These draft arrangements have since been 
under discussion in the Council, and as of early 2017 adoption did not yet appear to 
be in sight. 
In addition, the FAO Constitution and General Rules oblige the EU and the EU 
Member States to be transparent about their internal division of competences. At a 
general level, the EC had to submit a declaration of competence when it applied for 
membership, specifying its internal division of competences.55 Any subsequent 
changes in the division of competences must be communicated to the FAO.56 In 
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addition, the EU and the EU Member States must indicate before any meeting of the 
FAO who is competent with regard to which agenda item and who will exercise the 
right to vote.57 Other Member States of the FAO may at any time request the EU and 
the EU Member States to disclose their internal division of competences with regard 
to any specific matter.58 These transparency requirements place an additional burden 
on the EU – one with which it does not always comply. For example, the EU’s current 
declaration of competences still dates back to 1994, despite the subsequent 
developments in EU primary and secondary law. An updated draft declaration was 
only proposed by the Commission in 2013 and is still under consideration in the 
Council.59 
4.2. Observer status: The EU in ECOSOC, its subsidiary bodies, and 
UNCTAD 
 
In most (but not all) UN organs, bodies, programmes, funds and specialized 
agencies the EU has been granted an observer status in the course of time: 
ECOSOC is one of them. Unlike the FAO, ECOSOC is a body with limited 
membership. Its 54 members are elected by the UN General Assembly for a term of 
three years, taking into account geographical representation. To coordinate the 
membership bids of EU Member States, the EU has developed a complex system 
which determines the election intervals for each EU Member State.60  
Relations between ECOSOC and the EEC began on an informal basis and were 
progressively strengthened in the 1960s and 1970s. On 3 August 1967 ECOSOC 
adopted Resolution 1267 (XLIII), which recognized the increasing number of 
intergovernmental organizations active in the areas of economic and social 
governance and the fact that many of these organizations had already established 
informal and formal collaboration with various UN bodies.61 Considering that the 
development of “further contacts on a more systematic basis” would be “useful”, 
ECOSOC requested the UN Secretary General to propose intergovernmental 
organizations outside the UN framework which should be granted observer status in 
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the ECOSOC. It was considered that these organizations should be entitled to 
participate in the debates of the Council, without having the right to vote. Following 
the UN Secretary General’s report, ECOSOC extended a standing invitation to the 
EEC, granting it the right to “participate, with the approval of the Council and without 
the right to vote, in the Council’s debates on questions of [its] concern”.62 The EEC’s 
ad hoc participation, subject to invitation, was consequently turned into a permanent 
observer status. Rule 79 of the ECOSOC Rules of Procedure today provides: 
Representatives of intergovernmental organizations accorded permanent observer 
status by the General Assembly and of other intergovernmental organizations 
designated on an ad hoc or a continuing basis by the Council on the recommendation 
of the Bureau, may participate, without the right to vote, in the deliberations of the 
Council on questions within the scope of the activities of the organizations. 
A similar provision can be found in the joint Rules of Procedure of the currently eight 
functional commissions63 of ECOSOC.64 Here, the EU is equally entitled to 
participate as an observer without voting rights. 
An exceptional case, however, was the former Commission on Sustainable 
Development (CSD), which was established in 1993 as a functional commission of 
ECOSOC, tasked with ensuring the follow-up to the 1992 United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (Rio Conference) and monitoring the 
implementation of the Agenda 21.65 The EC had participated as a “full participant” in 
the Rio Conference, a status which was then perpetuated in the CSD.66 As a “full 
participant”, the EC enjoyed more rights than in the other functional commissions of 
ECOSOC, including the right to speak, the right of reply, the right to introduce 
proposals and amendments, as well as the right to take part in informal (and not 
merely formal) meetings.67 While the EC did not receive the right to vote, it was 
granted the right to submit proposals that had to be voted on, if CSD Members so 
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requested.68 In return, the EC committed to ensuring transparency about its internal 
division of competences between the Community and the Member States, by 
submitting a general declaration of competence.69 In line with UN General Assembly 
Resolution 66/288, the CSD was replaced by a High-level Political Forum on 
Sustainable Development (HLPF) in 2013.70 The EU retained its “full participant” 
status in those meetings convened under the auspices of the ECOSOC, while its 
“enhanced observer” rights apply in meetings convened under the auspices of the 
UN General Assembly. UN General Assembly Resolution 67/290 explicitly provides 
that the arrangements of UN General Assembly resolution 65/276 and ECOSOC 
decision 1995/201 apply.71 
The EU also has observer status in the regional commissions of ECOSOC.72 
Cooperation between the EEC and the UN Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) began in an informal manner, based on an exchange of letters between the 
Executive Secretariat of UNECE and the EEC Commission in 1958.73 Both 
organizations agreed to exchange information and to consult on issues of common 
interest. In addition, it was agreed that the EEC could participate as an observer in 
meetings of UNECE subject to invitation. Subsequently, the EEC’s participation 
rights were progressively expanded74 and in 1975 the EEC was granted regular 
observer status.75 Beyond that, and thanks to REIO clauses, the EU has become a 
party to several international conventions that were negotiated under the auspices of 
UNECE. For example, the EU and the EU Member States are parties to the 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution.76 Here again, the 
abovementioned issues associated with “mixity” arise. As provided for in Rule 29(7) 
and (8) of the Rules of procedure for sessions of the Executive Body for the 
Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, the EU and the EU Member 
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States must exercise their voting rights on an alternative basis, to avoid that a vote 
counts twice.77 This, again, requires the EU and the EU Member States to determine 
on a case by case basis who will exercise voting rights in the Executive Body. 
UNCTAD is another body where critics observed that the EU’s observer status did 
not reflect the major competences it had been granted internally.78 UNCTAD was 
established in 1964 as a subsidiary body of the UN General Assembly, tasked with 
promoting international trade and economic development, policy formulation and 
initiating the negotiation of international legal instruments in the field of trade.79 
UNCTAD’s mandate also foresaw that it establish links and cooperate with 
‘intergovernmental bodies whose activities are relevant to [UNCTAD’s] functions’,80 
the representatives of which should then be allowed to ‘participate, without vote, in its 
deliberations and in those of the subsidiary bodies and working groups established 
by it’.81 In line with this, the EU participates as an observer in the sessions of the 
Conference, the Trade and Development Board, as well as the subsidiary organs 
and working groups.82 In the latter, the EU is de facto able to participate as a full 
participant.83 In addition, the EU consults and exchanges documentation with the 
UNCTAD Secretariat. Post-Lisbon, the EU’s external representation and internal 
coordination mechanisms have been amended to reflect the Union’s new external 
relations architecture. The EU Delegation in Geneva now represents the EU and its 
Member States in UNCTAD, with the exception of the Working Party on the Strategic 
Framework and the Programme Budget.84 The EU Delegation also chairs the internal 
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coordination process among EU Member States.85 Beyond that, the EU has become 
a party to a number of commodities agreements that were negotiated under the 
auspices of UNCTAD. Initially, these negotiations were only open to states, while the 
EEC was merely granted a consultative status,86 despite its far-reaching internal 
competences in these areas. Since the 1960s this has gradually changed,87 and 
today the EU is a member of several commodities organizations, sometimes to the 
exclusion of EU Member States.88 
In their 2012 “Strategy for the progressive improvement of the EU status in 
international organisations and other fora in line with the objectives of the Treaty of 
Lisbon”, then European Commission President Barroso and Vice-President Ashton 
argued that this patchwork of limited participation rights “restrict[ed the] EU’s ability to 
effectively represent and participate”.89 They proposed that an “enhanced observer 
status”, similar to the one obtained in the UN General Assembly, should be the goal 
for EU participation also in other UN bodies, in particular ECOSOC and its subsidiary 
bodies.  
There should also be an effort to examine the political (and legal) feasibility to achieve 
enhanced rights along the lines of those in UNGA resolution 65/276 in certain UN 
programmes and funds and specialized agencies, where the EU usually enjoys observer 
status. In the case of UN principal organs, the focus should be on the Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) and at a later stage possibly also its subsidiary bodies (e.g. 
UNECE).
90
 
Interestingly, UNCTAD was not explicitly mentioned. In any case, so far, these plans 
appear to have remained theoretical – the 2012 Strategy was even taken off-line by 
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the Commission - and no efforts like the ones made in the UN General Assembly 
seem to be underway. 
 
4.3. No formal status: The EU and the World Bank 
 
Finally, there are a number of UN bodies active in global economic governance 
where the EU has no formal status. For example, despite being a major donor of 
ODA in general and ranking third among the contributors to World Bank trust funds,91 
the EU has no formal status in the World Bank and only observer status in the “Joint 
Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing 
Countries” (better known as Development Committee).92 The World Bank only 
recognizes states as members. The Member States’ ministers of finance or 
development sit on the World Bank’s Board of Governors, and they appoint the 
World Bank’s 25 Executive Directors, who, together with the President of the World 
Bank Group, make up the Boards of Directors.93 Three of the EU Member States are 
among the World Bank’s largest members and may consequently appoint their own 
Executive Director (France, Germany and the United Kingdom).94 The other EU 
Member States are spread across seven constituencies, five of which are currently 
led by an Executive Director from an EU Member State (Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Spain).95 
Development policy is a ‘parallel’ shared competence of the EU and its Member 
States (Article 4(4) TFEU). While the exercise of the competence by the Union does 
not prevent the Member States from exercising their competences, the principle of 
sincere cooperation requires them to refrain from any action that may run counter to 
obtaining the EU’s objectives.96 Consequently, if a matter at the World Bank falls into 
an area that has become increasingly ‘communitarised’ or governed by agreements 
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between the EU and third states, EU Member States should represent the position of 
the Union.97  
Compared to other international organizations, however, EU coordination at the 
World Bank is less developed and more recent. In particular, there is no permanent 
structure of coordination in Brussels, such as exists for example with regard to EU 
participation in the FAO (see above) or the UN human rights fora (Human Rights 
Working Group of the Council of the European Union, COHOM).98 However, 
coordination takes place in Washington between the EU Executive Directors and EU 
Member State representatives. In 2003, under the Italian Presidency, the Italian 
Executive Director established an informal consultation process of the EU Executive 
Directors in Washington, to coordinate European positions on the Board of Directors, 
exchange information and agree on joint positions.99 The EU Delegation in 
Washington participates in these meetings as an observer.100 Coordination is 
hampered in particular by the lack of a permanent forum in Brussels, the disparate 
representation of EU Member States in the World Bank (with ministers covering a 
diverse range of portfolios), the quick reaction times necessitated by World Bank 
projects, and the governance structure of the World Bank, which disperses EU 
Member States across different constituencies.101  
Nevertheless, the EU has developed a strong partnership with the World Bank, as 
indicated by the EU’s financial contributions to the World Bank’s funds. In 2001, both 
organizations concluded a “Trust Funds and Co-Financing Framework Agreement”, 
subsequently renewed and revised in 2009,102 2014103 and 2016,104 which governs 
the use of EU budget money for World Bank development projects. The European 
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Commission and the World Bank exchange information and coordinate on 
development cooperation, conduct policy dialogues on trade and agriculture and 
cooperate in the area of global public goods.105  
However, the gap between the EU’s financial contribution and its representation in 
the World Bank persists and proposals to combine the various EU Member State 
Executive Directorates into a single EU seat on the Board of Directors have so far 
received little support from EU Member States.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Despite the Union’s major role in international trade, finance and development, its 
political influence in many UN economic governance fora remains limited. While 
recent reforms have contributed to making EU internal coordination and external 
representation more effective, external obstacles, in particular the Union’s limited 
participation rights in most UN bodies, remain. As the 2010-2011 negotiations on the 
upgrade of the EU’s observer status in the UN General Assembly have shown, 
political willingness to strengthen the Union’s rights is often lacking – both in the EU 
Member States who may fear a silent “competence creep” and in third countries 
which may be concerned about setting a precedent. Even in those rare fora where 
the EU has obtained membership status, cumbersome coordination and 
transparency requirements may place a strain on effective EU participation. In a 
changing political environment – both within the EU and abroad – divisions and 
political resistance are only likely to grow. If the EU wants to be a ‘player’, and not 
just a ‘payer’, at the UN level,106 it needs to continue pushing for a stronger EU 
presence and to build on the positive dynamics created with the Lisbon Treaty.  
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